Historical Dynamics of Social Processes in Kazakhstan in the Conditions of Force Modernization (1920-1930 Years of the Xx Century)

[1]Nurmanova Ayagoz. K. , [2]Borbasov Saiyn Moldagaliyevich* , [3]Lebayev Farkhat R. , [4]Kurkeyev Yerzhan Maraluly

[1]PhD, Sh. Yessenov Caspian University of Technology and Engineering
Aktau, Kazakhstan https://orcid.org/ 0000-0002-5508-231X.
[2]Ch. Ch. Valikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Chief Research Fellow, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3105-3696
[3]Researcher, Master's in History
Ch.Ch. Valikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology
28 Shevchenko Street, Almaty, KAZAKHSTAN
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4105-7129
[4]Researcher, Ch.Ch. Valikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology, 28 Shevchenko Street, 050010 Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan, | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3430-8666, Corresponding Author*

HOW TO CITE:
Nurmanova Ayagoz. K. , Borbasov Saiyn Moldagaliyevich , Lebayev Farkhat R. , Kurkeyev Yerzhan Maraluly (2026). Historical Dynamics of Social Processes in Kazakhstan in the Conditions of Force Modernization (1920-1930 Years of the Xx Century). International Journal of Special Education, 41(15s), 799-814

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT:
Copyright: © 2026 Authors. Open access publication underthe terms and conditions of the Creative CommonsAttribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

ABSTRACT:
The Kazakh people underwent a very difficult development path as part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. They were constantly subject to various social reforms imposed against their will. Under the Bolshevik regime, coercive measures became even more severe. Social coercion became an indispensable element of the socialist reconstruction of Kazakh society. Upon coming to power, the Bolsheviks began to restrict the traditional social ties inherent in Kazakh society. The Soviet government's policies aimed at destroying the social structure of the Kazakh ethnic group, which had developed over decades of centuries. First and foremost, the wealthy, who formed the foundation of the ethnic group's economic and spiritual life, were excluded from the social structure. The Bolsheviks viewed the Kazakh wealthy as an exploitative class, living off the labor of others. They strove to create a society free from human exploitation. They believed that such a society would be the foundation of the people's well-being and social justice. In pursuit of this lofty goal, it was necessary to destroy the centuries-old social order of the peoples living in Soviet territory. For the Bolshevik Party, the fundamental interests of local indigenous ethnic groups were nothing more than empty talk. Although they constantly spoke of these interests, they took no concrete action to realize them. The gap between the Communist Party's words and actions was particularly noticeable in the social sphere. While promoting slogans about protecting the interests of the working masses, the Soviet government

implemented reforms that destroyed traditional social ties. Thus, the forced modernization policy pursued by the Soviet government cut the Kazakh people off from the natural evolutionary development of the global community. This isolation fro'm global civilizational processes became one of the main causes of the social suffering experienced by the Kazakh ethnic group in the 1920s and 1930s.

Keywords: Kazakh society; Historical Dynamics; Modernization

The Kazakh people underwent a very difficult development path as part of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. They were constantly subject to various social reforms imposed against their will. Under the Bolshevik regime, coercive measures became even more severe. Social coercion became an indispensable element of the socialist reconstruction of Kazakh society. Upon coming to power, the Bolsheviks began to restrict the traditional social ties inherent in Kazakh society. The Soviet government's policies aimed at destroying the social structure of the Kazakh ethnic group, which had developed over decades of centuries. First and foremost, the wealthy, who formed the foundation of the ethnic group's economic and spiritual life, were excluded from the social structure. The Bolsheviks viewed the Kazakh wealthy as an exploitative class, living off the labor of others. They strove to create a society free from human exploitation. They believed that such a society would be the foundation of the people's well-being and social justice. In pursuit of this lofty goal, it was necessary to destroy the centuries-old social order of the peoples living in Soviet territory. For the Bolshevik Party, the fundamental interests of local indigenous ethnic groups were nothing more than empty talk. Although they constantly spoke of these interests, they took no concrete action to realize them. The gap between the Communist Party's words and actions was particularly noticeable in the social sphere. While promoting slogans about protecting the interests of the working masses, the Soviet government implemented reforms that destroyed traditional social ties. Thus, the forced modernization policy pursued by the Soviet government cut the Kazakh people off from the natural evolutionary development of the global community. This isolation from global civilizational processes became one of the main causes of the social suffering experienced by the Kazakh ethnic group in the 1920s and 1930s.

The methodological basis of the study is a civilizational approach. L. Morgan, one of the founders of civilization theory, along with O. Spengler and other scholars, emphasized that culture and social modernization are the main foundations of civilization. Unfortunately, in Kazakhstan during the period under review, culture and the social sphere were relegated to the background. This occurred because, under the influence of Soviet policy, the Kazakh people deviated from the path of universal civilization during the process of modernization.

Global civilizational processes failed to exert the necessary influence on Kazakhstan's social development because the republic remained isolated within the Soviet socialist reality. All important issues of Kazakhstan's economic and social development depended on the center. This colonial dependence prevented the country from independently resolving its problems.

The center, violating the laws of universal civilizational development, forcibly imposed an alien power structure, an alien model of economic organization, and a different system of social relations on the

peoples of the country. The violation of civilizational norms led to enormous human losses and economic collapse.

Social processes and social policy in Kazakhstan during the period under review deviated from the mainstream of national development toward universal civilization. Kazakhstan, as part of the Soviet Union, began to lag significantly behind civilized countries in terms of material and spiritual culture.

The methodological basis of the research is the civilizational approach. One of the founders of the theory of civilization, Lewis Morgan [1], Oswald Spengler [2] and others, considered culture and social modernization as the basis of civilization. Unfortunately, culture and the social sphere were pushed to the background in Kazakhstan during the considered period. This happened because, under the influence of Soviet policy, the Kazakh people were excluded from the path of universal civilizational development. World civilization processes could not have the necessary influence on the social development of Kazakhstan. The republic remained isolated within the framework of the Soviet socialist reality. All important issues related to the economic and social development of Kazakhstan depend on the Center. It was a colonial dependence that did not allow him to solve his problems on his own. The center, violating the laws of universal civilizational development, forcibly imposed a foreign model of power, economic organization and social relations on the people of the country. Violation of the principles of civilizational development led to huge human losses and economic collapse. Social processes and social policy in Kazakhstan during the considered period remained outside the main direction of the development of nations along the path of universal civilization. Kazakhstan, as a part of the Soviet Union, began to significantly lag behind civilized countries in terms of material and spiritual culture.

The current generation of Kazakhstanis must learn from these events. For, "knowledge of the past is necessary to more successfully solve the problems life presents us with. History is the accumulated experience of humanity, often acquired at a very high price," writes renowned historian N.A. Yerofeyev [3].

To solve this problem, it was necessary to apply the theory of forced modernization. After the October Revolution of 1917, the new totalitarian government imposed the basic rules of social life on the Kazakh people. The Bolsheviks sought to modernize the Russian Empire. However, the Soviets achieved forced modernization, which eliminated everything old that hindered the development of society's creative potential. The Soviet modernization program was fundamentally different from Western modernist theories. However, at the same time, the process of modernization under capitalism and socialism necessarily included social processes, technology, economics, and social values. According to the founder of modernization theory, Ulman Rostov [4], theoretically, modernization processes encompass the fundamental aspects of economic and social life. Our study aims to demonstrate the consequences of the Soviet policy of forced modernization using examples of social life in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s. After all, "the task of historical science is to create a system of accurate historical knowledge about real, practically existing societies." "Historical knowledge is by its nature largely synthetic," writes V.I. Ignatiev [5]. The social reality of the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates the discrepancy between Bolshevik policy and the true social interests of the people of Kazakhstan.

Research on this topic was based on the principles of historical objectivity. One of the researchers of historical methodology, V.A. Dyakov, writes: "For a historian, the object of research is, first of all, the

objectively existing reality itself, which, from our point of view, seems to disintegrate into individual facts of one nature or another" [6]. Indeed, the historical dynamics of social processes in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s were characterized by the strong influence of external factors, which led to radical changes in the public life of Kazakh society. Socialist reforms aimed at establishing democracy led to tragic consequences. This objective reality is confirmed by numerous facts and examples. After all, "the most important feature of any knowledge, including social knowledge, is its objectivity. The objectivity of cognition of social phenomena is conditioned by the objectivity of historical reality," historians emphasize [7].

We view the social sphere of society as an internal system. People play a decisive role in it. As V.V. Bykov noted: "All internal systems of society, which include human activity, depend on this activity" [8]. The processes that took place in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s were decisively dependent on the subjective errors of those in power. Therefore, we understand the internal social system through the prism of human activity. As A.I. Rakitov noted: "Historical knowledge defines as its object a specific subject in history—a change in the development of socially significant and purposeful human activity over time" [9]. Understanding the complex social problems of Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s helps not only to create an accurate picture of the past but also to avoid repeating historical mistakes.

The historical dynamics of social processes in the 1920s and 1930s are characterized by the dominance of the power politics of the Soviet regime. This was associated with the implementation of the goals of accelerated industrialization of the economy and collectivization of agriculture. In creating a socialist, classless society, the Bolsheviks completely abandoned the traditional way of life of the Kazakh people. The centuries-old social hierarchy of Kazakh society was destroyed. The social group of the wealthy, which had been the economic and social support of the Kazakh people, was eliminated. The 1920s and 1930s also saw an increase in the frequency of natural disasters, leading to the mass death of livestock and the burning of crops.World history is replete with examples of social modernization. The social processes unfolding in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s have their own distinctive characteristics. These are primarily linked to the work of F.I. Goloshchekin, who became secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1925. With the approval of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), he launched the "Little October" movement in Kazakhstan, believing that the October Revolution of 1917 had had no revolutionary impact on the Kazakh steppe. As a result of the mindless destruction of the economic and social life of the Kazakh people, millions of livestock were destroyed, leading to mass famine in Kazakhstan. From 1917 to 1933, the Kazakh people experienced three catastrophic famines. During the 16 years of famine, according to conservative estimates, more than 3 million Kazakhs and over 500,000 people of other ethnicities perished. The republic lost over 50% of its population. During this period, the Kazakhs did not wage war against anyone, and there were no military attacks on Kazakhstan. The civil war between the Red Bolsheviks and the White Guards in 1918-1920 did not result in greater human losses than the famine.

The first famine of the Soviet era in 1917-1918 severely affected the Turkestan region. However, reliable historical evidence of this famine has not yet been collected. After a harsh winter and a dry summer, crops and livestock were destroyed in the region. As a result, the region experienced a terrible

famine. The death toll is estimated at 1 million.

In 1921–23, the second famine in Kazakhstan affected the Orenburg, Aktobe, Uralsk, Bukeyevo, and Kostanay regions and the Adayevsky district. By the end of 1921, the number of people who died from starvation reached 1,558,927 [10]. The famine affected more than 30 regions of Russia. 33 million people died of starvation in Samara, Saratov, Crimea, Bashkortostan, the Volga region, eastern Ukraine, and the Urals. More than 5 million people died of starvation in 1921–23 [11]. This famine caused significant demographic damage to Kazakhstan. In 1920–23, the population of the Kazak ASSR decreased from 4,998,838 people [12] to 3,786,910 people. Over the course of three years, the population of Kazakhstan decreased by 1,151,473 people [13]. If we assume that 100,000–200,000 people became refugees from the famine, the death toll would be approximately 1 million. Of course, it is impossible to imagine that the Soviet government refused to provide assistance to the victims of the famine. On August 9, 1921, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued an "Appeal to the Commissions for Aid to All Starving People" [14].

This document, signed by the Chairman and Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Kalinin […] obliged the state to provide comprehensive support to the People's Commissariat of Social Welfare. The People's Commissariat of Social Security, in turn, had to provide assistance to regions affected by famine. Unfortunately, the measures taken by the Soviet government in the central regions of Russia did not reach Kazakhstan. Local authorities were forced to use available resources. Grain and livestock from regions that did not suffer from famine were sent to the victims.

The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Kazakhstan, S. Mendeshev, headed the commission to combat famine in Kazakhstan. It included People's Commissar of Social Security A. Zhangeldin, People's Commissar of Food I. Shleifer, and Minister of Land and Water V. Kharlamov. On October 6, 1921, the Second Congress of the Central Executive Committee of Kazakhstan adopted the "Resolution on the Issue of Combating Famine" [15]. This document cited the drought of July 1921, followed by a locust infestation, as the main cause of the famine. The harvest was completely destroyed. The winter of two years earlier had been harsh. The jute harvest destroyed most of the livestock. The third reason was the confiscation of all food reserves from the peasants as a result of the policy of war communism, which led to a loss of motivation to work. If in 1917 arable land amounted to 5,840,000 dessiatines, then in 1921 it had decreased to 2,098,000 dessiatines. During this time, the livestock population decreased from 29,700,000 to 6,200,000. In 4 years, arable land had decreased by 47%, and the livestock population by 83% [16].

People weakened by hunger fell ill with various epidemic diseases. According to official data, more than 60 thousand people fell ill, of which 32,201 died [17]. By the end of 1921, the number of people who died of starvation in Kazakhstan reached 1,558,927 [18]. Hunger raged in Orenburg, Aktyubin, Ural, Bokei, Kostanay provinces and Adaevsky district. 841,043 homeless and starving children were registered in these regions [19]. In his report on the 3rd session, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Kazakhstan S. Mendesev noted that in 1922, 4,781,268 people lived in the republic, of which 2,832,000 suffered from hunger. If in December 1921, 128 thousand children died of hunger, then on March 1, 1923, 408 thousand children starved. 50.3% of the population consisted of Kazakhs, 31.2%

Russians, 14.4% Ukrainians, and 5% representatives of other nationalities [20].

The above examples illustrate the catastrophic scale of the famine. The demographic composition of the population was seriously disrupted. Fear of the future and social indifference reigned. Fearing Soviet repression, Kazakh bais and wealthy sharuis were unable to provide food and material aid to the famine-stricken regions. Local authorities, under the control of Bolshevik soviets, were unable to organize effective measures to combat the famine in 1921-1923. The central government's efforts to eradicate the famine failed to reach the Kazakh steppes. As a result, the bulk of the burden fell on the republican government, which relied primarily on local resources.

The Republican Commission for Combating Famine was able to provide concrete assistance to the starving. The People's Commissariat of Food organized 173 feeding stations. 425 canteens were opened for 225,466 children suffering from hunger. American Administrative Relief (ARA) fed 66,380 children daily from January 25, 1922; from February 15, food aid was provided to 130,000 children daily [21].

Between 1923 and 1930, the situation of the Sharua in Kazakhstan improved significantly. They managed to increase the volume of basic agricultural products. This was facilitated by the decision of the 10th Congress of the RCP(b), held in 1927. A new economic policy was implemented, and taxes were reduced from 70% to 30% [22]. As a result, in 1925, the livestock population in Kazakhstan doubled compared to 1922 [23].

However, the Bolshevik Party adopted a policy of accelerated industrialization and collectivization. The policy of confiscating the lands of wealthy peasants and landowners began in 1928. On August 9, 1928, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution "On the Confiscation of Farms and the Deportation of the Largest Livestock Breeders" [24]. More than 700 farms were expropriated. The majority of the confiscated property (60-70%) was to be transferred to the poor. The best-organized farms of the rich landowners were to be used to create collective farms using the agricultural laborers who worked on them. Surplus livestock was to be transferred to existing state and collective farms. Breeding livestock was to be transferred to breeding farms and local agricultural educational institutions [25].

The authorities believed that the powerful bais (lords) would hinder the Sovietization of the steppe. After the confiscation of the bais' lands, the ruthless exploitation of ordinary sharuis (peasants) began. The destruction of the social group of powerful wealthy individuals led to the degradation of the traditional economic order of the Kazakh ethnic people. Soviet land reforms led the lives of the Kazakh sharuis into a dead end. The collected livestock, lacking forage, was uselessly destroyed. Food collected from the peasants also perished due to the lack of transport. The incompetence and inefficiency of local Soviet authorities, combined with excessive taxes from the center, paved the way for a new, even more terrible famine. The Soviet government failed to learn the lessons of the famine of 1921-1923 and refused to listen to them. It repeated the mistakes and excesses committed.

After the onset of forced collectivization, the situation of the Kazakh peasantry worsened further. Most Kazakhs lived in rural areas. Their main source of food was extensive nomadic livestock farming. Until the late 1920s, the Kazakh people did not participate in the process of urbanization. Farmers in the southern regions also found themselves in a difficult situation. All their grain reserves were confiscated to supply

industrial centers. For example, the resolution of the Syr Darya Regional Committee of January 7, 1928, stated: "As a result of the drought, grain prices are very high… Grain procurers from state cooperatives cannot find wheat for domestic consumption. As a result of the active activity of state cooperatives, bread has become much more expensive on the grain market. Poor farmers cannot find grain for sowing [26]."

Documents clearly show that forced collectivization in Kazakhstan led to the impoverishment of the peasantry. In the Syr Darya province, grain collection officials from state cooperatives confiscated surplus grain and ignored the sowing season. The governorate was unable to obtain a state loan of 23,200 rubles due to jute shortages and drought [27]. The Bolshevik authorities knew that jute posed a potential problem in the region. Nevertheless, they deemed it necessary to comply with the Central Committee's grain procurement directive.

The memoirs of those who survived the famine testify to the immense suffering inflicted on the Kazakh people. The Bolshevik reforms devalued human life, endangering the lives of millions and leaving an indelible mark. P. Baikulov collected the recollections of hundreds of Kazakhs in his multi-volume memoir, "Famine in the Auley-Ata Region," published in 2020. Citing specific examples from people's lives, he depicts the horrific events that occurred during the famine of 1931-1933. For example, veteran worker Aman Daniyarov writes that he was born in 1931, when residents of Central Kazakhstan fled to the southern regions to escape starvation. Aman's mother died immediately after giving birth. His father fed him milk from his only mare until he was five years old. Aman recounts the memories of his father, who said that collectivization began in the Saryar steppe in 1929. Daniyarov's small livestock was confiscated. He crossed the Shu River and reached the village of Saudakent. Here, in 1931, collectivization began. By 1934, forty-nine collective farms had been established. By 1941, only thirty-nine remained. Ten collective farms died of starvation because they received no state aid. Those who survived became famine refugees. The residents of Saudakent decided to resettle in Kyrgyzstan. However, the military blocked their path. More than 700 families died of starvation on the return journey to Saudakent [28].

An analysis of these memoirs reveals that the main cause of the famine of 1931-1933 was the irrational policy of forced collectivization of agriculture, which devastated the economic life of the Kazakh people. The next main cause cited was a natural factor—recurring droughts and heavy rains. The third reason was the disappearance of the bais as a class. Respondents believe that the wealthy constituted the socioeconomic foundation of the Kazakh ethnic group.

Government documents concerning the procurement of grain and the shipment of wheat, barley, and oats placed strict demands on the center. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars assigned law enforcement agencies the special task of conducting grain procurement campaigns. The courts, prosecutors, and the anti-crime apparatus were obliged to keep this important state campaign at the forefront. A secret circular from the People's Commissariat of Justice of the KASSR, "On the Conduct of the Grain Procurement Campaign," clearly demonstrates how law enforcement agencies were used as a repressive force against the people [29]. It was prescribed to ruthlessly and openly punish peasants who failed to pay agricultural taxes, debts, and obligations. Pressure was intensified to

ensure the procurement of grain for industrial regions.

A decree was issued to increase meat production in regions with low grain production. In each province, "provincial emergency troikas" were created, consisting of the chairman of the regional committee, the GPU leaders, and the chairman of the regional court. These troikas were established in each district. They were responsible for the forced confiscation of grain, meat, and other agricultural products from peasants and middle-class peasants as taxes, fees, and payments. In the 1930s, these troikas became the main organs of political repression. Shortages of industrial and consumer goods were felt throughout Kazakhstan. The shortage of clothing, textiles, tea, sugar, and other goods was particularly acute.

In early 1927, famine struck several regions. A summer drought and fodder shortage led to starvation in the Zharkent district of Zhetysu province. "Fifty thousand pounds of wheat, which was supposed to arrive from China, were harvested. Some residents, suffering from hunger and disease, emigrated to China," wrote N.S. Makayev, secretary of the Zhetysu gubernatorial committee, to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [30].

The confiscation of peasants, the economic and social backbone of every household, destroyed the traditional Kazakh economic system. The average household received 10 head of sheep, cows, and a horse. This amount of livestock was woefully inadequate to provide food for a large Kazakh family. In the early 1930s, the social structure of Kazakh society changed radically. Poor peasants and workers lost their employers and, consequently, their sources of material wealth. A new form of wealth transformation arose, altering its socioeconomic mission. Having lost the Kazakh people, a prosperous social group, the Soviet regime led Kazakhstan to social catastrophe. Last year, Kazakhstan experienced a terrible famine. With several thousand herds of sheep and horses, wealthy Kazakhs always saved their people from mass starvation. The disruption of these centuries-old socio-ethnic and economic orders led to the famine. Natural disasters and storms frequently recurred in the Kazakh steppes. However, they never resulted in mass casualties. Livestock loss or loss of livestock herds. Because Kazakh clans and tribes constantly helped each other. Villages that weren't subjected to jute shared their wealth with neighbors in need. Under Bolshevik rule, such mutual assistance became impossible. The government removed people from the communal practice of overcoming natural and other disasters.

The campaign of confiscation, eviction, and social persecution of landowners began on August 9, 1928, with the adoption of a public resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), "On the Confiscation of Farms and the Eviction of the Largest Livestock Breeders" [30]. Based on this resolution, peasants from the wealthy middle class, along with large livestock breeders, also began to be confiscated. Everywhere, during farm inspections, district and Bolshevik executive committees recorded in their reports previously sold, slaughtered, and lost livestock. The number of their livestock was artificially inflated several times. As a result, virtually no viable farms remained in the villages. Thus, the process of confiscation became a destructive force in Kazakh agriculture. Along with the rich, the middle class the main social force of Kazakh society wealthy peasants, was also destroyed.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) believed that the development of agriculture in Kazakhstan was conditioned by the transition of the Kazakh peasantry to a

sedentary lifestyle. In accordance with the decision of the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the socialist reconstruction of agriculture in the republic, measures were taken to resettle the Kazakh peasantry. On November 7, 1929, the Bureau of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a secret resolution "On the resettlement of the Kazakh people" [32]. It was noted that the Kazakh economy was backward, and in some places […] was a serious obstacle to the restoration of agriculture by preserving its farms here [33].

Peasants should unite to create large collective farms. Russian peasants should train Kazakh sharuis to cultivate the land, sow, and harvest. Such an organization would facilitate the international unification of peasants and peasants, and they would unite in the fight against wealthy kulaks, believed F. Goloshchekin, Secretary of the Kazakhstan Regional Committee of the CPSU (Bolsheviks). It was precisely through his fault that extremist events occurred in Kazakhstan. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan experienced the terrible tragedy of famine.

The republican authorities confiscated all grain from the population. For example, in Semipalatinsk, 400,000 poods of wheat and 120,000 poods of flour were collected. All warehouses were full. Not a single kilogram of flour from the collected grain was distributed among the local population, who were suffering from hunger. Fomin, secretary of the Semipalatinsk District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), urgently requested the allocation of railway cars to transport this grain to the central regions [34].

The local population, having exhausted its hidden resources, began to protest the violence and injustice of the Soviet government. One such armed uprising began on November 3, 1929, in the Batpakkar district of the Kostanay region. 400-500 peasants, 50 of whom were armed, took part in the uprising. They arrested local authorities and destroyed all documents of party and Soviet bodies. They burned down the house of a former mullah, which housed the court, police, and cooperative organizations. The rebels chanted slogans such as "Liquidate Soviet power," "Return the cattle and land confiscated by the bay and return them to the various villages," "Liquidate the communists," and "Restore mosques and churches."

The rebels attempted to coordinate their political demands through organized action. They elected Omar Barmakov as temporary khan. They planned to gather 50 warriors from each village and organize a military detachment of 1,000 "soldiers." They planned to send the first detachment to Turgai and establish a temporary center of the uprising there. The second part of the detachment was to capture the city of Nauryzym and besiege Kustanai. The rebels planned to form an alliance with the Russian peasants. They demanded an end to grain purchases. They organized meetings between wealthy beys (bays) and Russian kulaks (kulaks) at the Pokrovskaya Fair and in the village of Semiozernoe. They spread rumors that Kalinin had been killed and that Soviet power was about to fall. Smaghul Saduakasov came to power in Kazakhstan [35].

The Batpakkara rebellion was led by nine individuals. They maintained contact with Mirzhakip Dulatov, one of the leaders of the Alash Orda movement. The rebels protested the social oppression of Kazakhs, the persecution of Islam, and the closure of a mosque. More than 300 similar uprisings and social protests occurred throughout Kazakhstan. The Soviet government, with its standing army, suppressed these isolated uprisings and severely punished the organizers. The Soviets' continuous repressive measures, the confiscation of

property and livestock from wealthy landowners, and the establishment of grain and meat processing plants fueled social fear among the Kazakhs. They believed that the disruption of traditional social order and economic practices would lead to a terrible famine.

The "complete collectivization" carried out in 1930-1931 continued the decline of Kazakh agriculture. The population, especially the Sharua, found themselves in a catastrophic situation. The industrial policy of the Soviet Union increasingly demanded money and food. All property and livestock of the rich and kulaks were confiscated. As a result, in 1929-1930 alone, the livestock population in Kazakhstan decreased by 30-35% [36]. It became clear that the population, organically linked to livestock farming, faced the threat of famine. In official documents of the 1930s, terms such as "food shortage," "nomads," "situation of famine," "hungry," "swollen people," and "hunger sufferers" were used in connection with the phenomenon of mass famine.

Kazakh historiography still has no consensus regarding the number of people who perished in the famine of 1931-1933. M. Tatimov and T. Omarbekov, in their «Kazakhstan. National Encyclopedia», note the dire demographic consequences of the famine. Based on data from the head of the land survey expedition, Professor S.P. Shvetsov, they note that the population of Kazakhstan decreased by 30% as a result of the famine of 1921-1923. Compared with the 1926 and 1939 censuses, they calculate that from June 1, 1930, to June 1, 1933, the rural population of Kazakhstan decreased by 3,379,500 people. They exclude 1 million refugees from this figure and estimate that the famine of 1931-1933 claimed the lives of more than 2,200,000 Kazakhs. As a result, 48% of the Kazakh population living in Kazakhstan perished. The famine primarily affected women and children. This is why the country suffered severe demographic losses. Similar data were cited by a commission of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which specifically studied this issue in 1992 [37].

Archival materials collected by Kazakh historians prove that the famine of 1931-1933 was the most tragic event in the history of the Kazakh people. This fact was known, but it was kept secret. One of the authors of this article, as a student in 1971, heard this truth from Professor M. Akhinzhanov, a specialist in Kazakh ethnogenesis. He told his history students that, according to his calculations, the Kazakhs lost approximately 2,500 people during the famine of 1931-1933.

Since then, Kazakhstani historical scholarship has been enriched by thousands of new, previously classified documents. Many documents have been made available for scholarly use through state projects such as "Cultural Heritage," "Kazakhstan in the Stream of History," "Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Kazakhstan," and others. A new narrative emerges in the five-volume work "History of Kazakhstan (from Ancient Times to the Present Day)," published in 2010. The fourth volume of this publication is dedicated to separate sections on the famines of 1921-1922 and 1931-1933. The latest archival documents prove that the famine of 1921-1922 continued into 1923.

This publication notes that one of the main causes of the famine of 1931-1933 was the coercive policies of the Goloshchekin regime. Comparing the results of the 1926 and 1939 censuses, the authors show that in 1926, 3,628,000 Kazakhs lived in the Kazakh ASSR. Twelve years later, in 1936, their number had decreased to 1,321,000. The local Kazakh population had decreased by 36.7% [38].

Goloshchekin's regime operated under the slogan "No surplus, no livestock." This slogan contained a terrible contradiction. All livestock was confiscated from wealthy Kazakh families and peasants. However,

this was not enough. Rumors circulated among those in power that the Kazakhs would perish without livestock. Some researchers consider this a genocidal policy aimed at the deliberate extermination of the Kazakh ethnic group. However, Soviet historical scholarship concealed from the international community the fact that the Kazakh people were experiencing a terrible demographic crisis as a result of the totalitarian command system.

Official census results show that the Kazakh population declined by 2.3 million between 1926 and 1939. This occurred despite the Bolshevik government's interest in mitigating the demographic and economic consequences of the famine. The primary cause of the famine was the policy of forcibly destroying the traditional nomadic, large-scale livestock farming of the Kazakhs.

The history of the famine has been distorted. The historical truth about the catastrophic consequences of the colonial empire's policies began to be systematically and reliably revealed in 1991, after Kazakhstan gained independence. Kazakh journalists described the famine of 1931-1933 as a genocide of the Kazakh ethnic people. Professional historians believe that the Bolsheviks did not intend to commit genocide. However, the policy of forced modernization led to such tragic consequences.

It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of people who died of starvation. Academician historians B. Tulepbayev and V. Osipov estimate the number of those who died of starvation at 1.1 million Kazakhs and 250 thousand representatives of other nationalities. Academician M. Kozybayev estimates the number of deaths at 2.1 million people. Of these, 1 million 750 thousand were Kazakhs and 350 thousand representatives of other nationalities. Renowned demographers, academician M. Asylbekov and A. Gali, agree with Kozybayev. M. Tatimov and T. Omarbekov provide information about 2.1-2.3 million people who died of starvation. Writers B. Nurzhekeev and S. Elubayev estimate the number of famine victims at 3 million people. Comparing several sources of information, ethnodemographer S. Aimbetov estimates the number of famine victims at 2.5 million [39].

It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of people who died of starvation. Academician historians B. Tulepbayev and V. Osipov estimate the number of those who died of starvation at 1.1 million Kazakhs and 250 thousand representatives of other nationalities. Academician M. Kozybayev estimates the number of deaths at 2.1 million people. Of these, 1 million 750 thousand were Kazakhs and 350 thousand representatives of other nationalities. Renowned demographers, academician M. Asylbekov and A. Gali, agree with Kozybayev. M. Tatimov and T. Omarbekov provide information about 2.1-2.3 million people who died of starvation. Writers B. Nurzhekeev and S. Elubayev estimate the number of famine victims at 3 million people. Comparing several sources of information, ethnodemographer S. Aimbetov estimates the number of famine victims at 2.5 million [39].

Despite the catastrophic social situation of the Kazakh Sharua, who constituted the majority of the ethnic group, local Bolsheviks reported to the center on the achievements of socialist reforms in Kazakhstan. The authorities concealed the true picture of the social catastrophe. The Bolsheviks never admitted their guilt, as their policies were the main cause of the ongoing trials. For this reason, a large corpus of archival documents relating to the famine in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 1930s was sealed, hidden, and some destroyed.

Due to the taboo on discussing this topic, historians still cannot estimate the exact

number of people who died during the famines of 1917-1918, 1921-1923, and 1931-1933. To fill this gap in Kazakhstan's history, in 2021, the Senate of the Republic introduced a collection of documents for scholarly circulation entitled "Asharshalyk. Famine. 1928-1934. Documentary Chronicle." In 2021, the Central Archives of the Republic of Kazakhstan published the second volume of the collection, entitled "Kazakhstandagy asharshylyk. Famine in Kazakhstan. 1921-1923." In 2023, researchers from the Sh. Ch. Ualikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology prepared a multi-volume publication entitled "The Famine in Kazakhstan in the 1920s and Its Consequences." The Institute is also preparing to publish a 20-volume collection, "Memoirs of Eyewitnesses and Their Descendants of the Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933." The search for new documents on the famine continues. As a result, a rich collection of new archival documents and memoirs will be introduced into scholarly circulation, allowing researchers to present an objective historical picture of the famine in Kazakhstan.

In January 1930, the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) presented the resettlement of Kazakhs as a major victory for Soviet national policy in Kazakhstan in its report, "The Settlement of the Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Population." It noted that "it creates the conditions for the elimination of the remnants of feudalism and tribal ties in the village, deals a decisive blow to the economic strength and political influence of the rich, wealthy, and opens the possibility of a rapid rise in the cultural level of the Kazakh working masses."

The reality was quite different. By 1931, Kazakhstan was in the grip of famine. According to the Confiscation Law, 400 head of livestock were confiscated from nomadic areas, 300 from semi-nomadic areas, and 150 from sedentary areas. Each family in nomadic areas was left with 25 head of livestock, 15 in semi-nomadic areas, and 11 in sedentary areas [41]. The farmsteads of 615 wealthy individuals were confiscated. 145,000 head of livestock and agricultural machinery were distributed among 877 collective farms and 24,491 poor households [42]. Collectivization was carried out under the strict control of party organs. Livestock and grain collected from the peasants were sent to industrial centers. Kazakh peasants, deprived of food reserves, suffered from natural disasters. These two factors became the main causes of mass famine in Kazakhstan. In the resolution "On Agriculture and, in Particular, Livestock Breeding in Kazakhstan," adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on September 17, 1932, the party body recommended avoiding haste and leftist extremism in the implementation of collectivization policies. However, not a word was said about the terrible famine experienced by the local population [43].

To survive the famine, Kazakhs were forced to migrate en masse to China, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. For example, more than 10 thousand unbiased Kazakhs from the Pavlodar region came to the Slavgorod region of Western Siberia. По данным, милиция Славгорода каждый день собирала на улицах и в общественных местах 2-3 трупа умерших от голода казахов[44]. Such a serious situation has become a normal occurrence in almost all regions bordering Kazakhstan.

Head of the Kazakh party committee F. Goloshchekin's policy of Sovietization of the Kazakh village led to dire consequences. Campaigns for the production of grain and meat, mass collectivization of farms, forced confiscation of food supplies of the people, economic measures subordinated to the interests of the industrialization policy of

the Soviet Union, natural difficulties subjected the Kazakh people to mass famine unprecedented in history. In 1916, the number of 6 million Kazakhs living on the territory of Kazakhstan decreased to 2.4 million people by 1933. Of these, about 2.2–2.3 million people became victims of the famine of 1931–1933. [45].

As a result of forced modernization, not only the demographic composition of the population of Kazakhstan, but also the social appearance of Kazakh society has radically changed. Nomadic extensive livestock farming, which for centuries had been the main source of subsistence for the Kazakh people, was destroyed. In addition, within a few years, the rich group, which was one of the important and traditional pillars of the social structure of Kazakh society, was destroyed, and the existing socio-economic system of society was destroyed. These processes significantly influenced the traditional organizational mechanisms of Kazakh society and led to a change in the direction of its historical development.

As a result of forced modernization, not only the demographic composition of the population of Kazakhstan, but also the social appearance of Kazakh society has radically changed. Nomadic extensive livestock farming, which for centuries was the main source of subsistence for the Kazakh people, has disappeared from the historical scene. In addition, for several years, the rich class, which was an important pillar of its economic and social life, was excluded from the social structure of Kazakh society.

The destruction of the institution of the rich had a significant impact on the economic management system, social relations and social organization of traditional Kazakh society. As a result, the existing social structure of Kazakh society was destroyed, and in its place a new social model based on Soviet ideology was introduced. These processes made profound changes in the historical development of the Kazakh people and weakened the foundations of traditional society.

There was no war. However, a huge number of people died in peacetime. This situation shows that the Soviet government was unable to find an effective and correct way to modernize Kazakh society. The policy of radical transformation of traditional society by force led to heavy human casualties.

As a result of three famines that occurred between 1917 and 1933, the Kazakh people lost more than 3.3 million people in just 16 years. As a result, the Kazakhs lost about half of their population. By comparison, the population of Uzbekistan, which was around 2 million in 1917, has now reached over 30 million. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Kazakh population, which was about 6 million people, increased to only 14 million in the later period.

Thus, the demographic growth of the Uzbek population, which did not experience famine, was several times higher, while the growth of the Kazakh population was at a much slower pace. There are scientific forecasts that if it were not for the famines of the Soviet period, today the Kazakh population would be much larger and could reach about 40 million people.

These data clearly show how complex and sad the socio-demographic situation was in Kazakhstan in the 20-30s of the twentieth century.

Most researchers see the main cause of the famine in the economic reforms of the Soviet government, based on administrative and authoritarian methods. These reforms took into account socio-economic features of Kazakh society, traditional economic structure and way of life. Artelis, cooperatives for joint cultivation of land (TOZ), cooperatives and collective farms, created for the purpose of restructuring

rural life on socialist principles, could not effectively perform their functions in the expected period. In addition, new socialist forms and methods of management have been developed, which could replace the extensive nomadic cattle breeding of Kazakhs in a short period of time. As a result of several years of reforms, Kazakh peasants, who lost cattle, grain and food supplies, faced mass starvation and mass murders.

The vast majority of researchers point to economic reforms carried out by the Soviet government using administrative and authoritarian methods as the main cause of the famine. These reforms did not fully take into account the peculiarities of the economic and social life of Kazakh society. Artels, TOZs (enterprises for joint cultivation of land), cooperatives and collective farms, created for the purpose of reorganizing agriculture on a socialist basis, could not work effectively in a short period of time. In addition, new methods and forms of farming have not been formed that could quickly replace the traditional extensive nomadic cattle breeding of the Kazakhs. As a result, over several years of reforms, Kazakh peasants, who had lost livestock, grain and food supplies, faced mass starvation and massacres.

The extortionist policies implemented during mass collectivization were one of the most severe blows to the Kazakh people. Its consequences affected both the semi-nomadic and sedentary Kazakh populations, plunging them into a profound socioeconomic crisis. Goloshchekin's government pursued a policy based on authoritarian and administrative methods, ignoring the historical traditions, way of life, and established economic structures of the Kazakh people.

As a result of the reforms carried out during this short historical period, the Kazakh Sharua, deprived of livestock, grain reserves, and food, suffered mass famine and mass murder. The gross distortions that occurred during the policy of mass collectivization were one of the most severe blows to the Kazakh ethnic group. This blow did not spare the semi-nomadic and sedentary Kazakhs. The Soviet authorities, led by Goloshchekin, did not consider it necessary to take into account the historical traditions, way of life, and established economic management practices of the Kazakh people.

The Soviet government failed to learn from its mistakes. As a result, famine struck Kazakhstan three times in a short period of time. In addition to these tragedies, a large-scale campaign of political repression began in the 1930s. After the liquidation of the wealthy, considered an exploitative class, mass repressions targeted the Kazakh intelligentsia. Those who expressed their views on the causes and consequences of the famine, as well as the shortcomings of Communist Party policy, were subjected to brutal persecution and merciless punishment.

The Kazakh people, who suffered heavy demographic losses, learned a deep spiritual lesson from this historical period. The socialist totalitarian system left an indelible wound in the national consciousness and historical memory of the Kazakh people. This policy caused significant damage to the spiritual development of the nation, public opinion and the system of traditional values.

The psychology of fear and unquestioning submission to authority is deeply ingrained in Kazakh society. These processes can be considered one of the greatest national tragedies in the history of the Kazakh ethnic group.

References

Stern, B. J. *L. H. Morgan: Social Evolutionist*. Chicago, 1931.

Hughes, H. S. *O. Spengler: A Critical Estimate*. New York, 1962.

Erofeev, N. A. *What Is History?* Moscow: Nauka, 1976. 134 p.

Rostow, W. W. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Ignatyev, V. I. “Historical Materialism and the Problem of Levels of Historical Science.” In: *Problems of Methodology of Scientific Research*. Novosibirsk, 1982. 166 p.

Dyakov, V. A. *Methodology of History: Past and Present*. Moscow, 1974. 190 p.

Ivanov, G. M., Kor, A. M., & Petrov, Yu. V. *Methodological Problems of Historical Cognition*. Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola, 1981. 296 p.

Bykov, V. V. *Methods of Science*. Moscow: Nauka, 1974. 215 p.

Rakitov, A. I. *Historical Cognition: A Systemic Epistemological Approach*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. 303 p.

Volume 2. File 123. Sheet 204.

Famine in Kazakhstan. 1921–1923: Collection of Documents and Materials. Vol. 1. Comp. by S. Shildebai et al. Almaty: Bolashaq, 2021. 652 p.

Statistical and Economic Review of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic. Orenburg: Central Statistical Administration of the Kirghiz SSR, 1923. 230 p.

History of Kazakhstan (From Ancient Times to the Present Day). Almaty: Atamura, 2010. 752 p.

The Famine in Kazakhstan in the Early 1920s and Its Consequences: Collection of Documents. Almaty, 2023. 5040 p.

Resolutions and Decrees of the Second Congress of Soviets of the Kirghiz SSR, 4–10 October 1921. Orenburg, 1922. 20 p.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 139. Opis 1. File 252. Sheet 129.

State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Fond 1064. Opis 2. File 123. Sheet 204.

History of Kazakhstan (From Ancient Times to the Present Day). Five-volume edition. Vol. 4. Almaty, 2010. 752 p.

Report of the Council of Labor and Defense of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic for April–September 1922. Economic Publication of the Council of Labor and Defense and the State Planning Committee of the Kirghiz SSR. Orenburg, No. 7, 1922. 60 p.

History of Kazakhstan (From Ancient Times to the Present Day). Five-volume edition. Vol. 4. Almaty, 2010. 752 p.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 139. Opis 1. File 252. Sheets 129–131.

History of Kazakhstan: Encyclopedia. Almaty, 2019. 848 p.

Ibid. P. 794.

Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle. Collection of Documents. Vol. 1: 1928–1929. Almaty, 2021. 920 p.

Ibid. P. 253.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 1726. Sheet 31.

Ibid. Sheet 31.

Baikulov, T. *The Famine in the Aulie-Ata Region*. Multi-volume Collection. Vol. 2. Almaty, 2020. 672 p.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 2086. Sheets 24–31. Source: *Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle*. Collection of Documents. Vol. 1: 1928–1929. Almaty, 2021. 920 p.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 1696. Sheets 291–324.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 1687. Sheet 12. Source: *Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle*. Collection of Documents. Vol. 1: 1928–1929. Almaty, 2021. 920 p.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 2067. Sheets 1–5.

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 2388. Sheets 111–118.

Ibid. P. 865.

Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). Fond 82. Opis 2. File 660. Sheets 93–95.

Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle. Collection of Documents. Vol. 1: 1928–1929. Almaty, 2021. 920 p.

Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle. Collection of Documents. Vol. 2: 1930–1931. Almaty, 2021. 1240 p.

Kazakhstan: National Encyclopedia. Ten-volume edition. Vol. 1. Almaty, 1998. 720 p.

History of Kazakhstan (From Ancient Times to the Present Day). Five-volume edition. Vol. 4. Almaty, 2010. 752 p.

History of Kazakhstan: Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. Almaty, 2019. 848 p. (pp. 254–260).

Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle. Collection of Documents. Vol. 2: 1930–1931. Almaty, 2021. 1240 p.

History of the Kazakh SSR: The Socialist Era. Alma-Ata, 1967. 840 p. (pp. 265–267).

Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (APRK). Fond 141. Opis 1. File 2404. Sheet 24.

Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). Fond 17. Opis 3. File 2014. Sheets 33–34.

Famine. 1928–1934: Documentary Chronicle. Collection of Documents. Vol. 3: 1932–1933. Almaty, 2021. 1028 p. (pp. 77–78).

Kazakhstan: National Encyclopedia. Ten-volume edition. Vol. 1. Almaty, 1998. 720 p. (p. 582).

Kumari, K. (2025). Contribution of the role of leftist ideology in Indian politics: A historical assessment. ShodhSamajik: Journal of Social Studies, 2(2), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.29121/ShodhSamajik.v2.i2.2025.51

Pathak, G. (2024). Artistic and cultural innovations of Srimanta Sankardeva: A historical exploration of enduring traditions in Assam. ShodhSamajik: Journal of Social Studies, 1(1), 63–76. https://doi.org/10.29121/ShodhSamajik.v1.i1.2024.38

Pathak, G. (2024). Artistic and cultural innovations of Srimanta Sankardeva: A historical exploration of enduring traditions in Assam. ShodhSamajik: Journal of Social Studies, 1(1), 63–76. https://doi.org/10.29121/ShodhSamajik.v1.i1.2024.38